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l.

INTRODUCTION

This essay links constitutional abortion rights, ideals of citizen
ship, and ideals of gender equality. It begins with a pair of en
dorsements and then critically assesses three popular arguments
scholars offer in support of the view that a proposed doctrine of
equal protection is superior to the Supreme Court's doctrine of
privacy-related liberty, as the constitutional basis for abortion
rights.
In Part I, I endorse a claim that many influential lawyers and
judges regard as a fraud. The claim, implicit in abortion rights
advocacy, is that abortion rights are a precondition of full or
"first class" citizenship for women. In Part II, I endorse argu* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. This essay includes remarks I made on
March 5, 1 994, at the Federalist Society Symposium at the University of Virginia, where I
participated on a panel entitled "The Constitution on Sex." It also includes my lecture at
a Brown University Conference, "Equal Protection and its Critics: The Law and Politics of
First Class Citizenship, " held on March 1 1 , 1 994. I am indebted to Norma Schrock and
Elizabeth Allen for legal research, and to Professor Nancy Rosenblum for critical
commentary.

420

Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 1 8

ments for abortion premised o n the constitutional embodiment
of the ideal of political equality and ful l citizenship-th e Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. H aving previ
ously defended the Supreme Court's doctrine that privacy rights
against

restrictive

abortion

laws

flow

from

the

Fourte enth

Amendment guarantee of liberty, 1 in this essay I embrace a pro
posed equal prote ction doctrine, as wel l .
Abortion policy implicates women's privacy an d e quality. 2 Ad
vocates for abortion rights have sometimes implied the conflu
ence of privacy and equality concerns by arguing for gender
equality under the banner of the privacy doctrine . 3 M any have
made privacy arguments with the goal of gender equality in
mind ; many have made equality arguments with the goal of in
creasing wome n ' s privacy-related liberty. A constitutional j uris
prude nce of abortion that expressly draws on the Fourteenth
Amendment's

language

of " liberty"

and

"equal

protection"

would meld with the reality that many of the root concerns be
hind privacy argum ents are not different from, or in opposition
to , the root concerns of the gender equality arguments.4
l. See Anita L.Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56
U.CIN. L. REv. 461 ( 1987); Tribe'sjudirious Feminism, 44 STAN. L. REv. 179 (1991); Auton
omy's Magic Wand, 72 B.U. L. REv. 683 (1992); In the Wake of the Abortion Derision; For Some
Women, Some Solace, New Concern, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 23; Court Disables Dispuled
Legacy of Privacy Right, NAT'L LJ., August 13, 1990, at S8, S14; Anita L. Allen, UNE.A.SY
AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE SoCIETY ( 1988).
2. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Qy.estions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 265, 377-379 (1992 ) ("Restrictions
on abortion thus offend constitutional guarantees of equal protection, not simply because
of the status-based injuries they inflict on women [that is, compromising opponunities for
education and employment], but also because of the status-based attitudes about women
they reflect." !d. at 379). Siegel astutely notes that "antiabortion laws . . . like antimis
cegenation laws, have moorings in both privacy and equal protection." !d. at 263. See Web
ster v. Reproductive Services, No. 88-605 in the Supreme Court of the United States, Brief
for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel
lees, 11 WOMEN's RTs.L. REP. 281, 285 ( 1989) ("the Court should not overrule . . Roe
without considering ... Equal Protection Clause argument[s] ").
Cf Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 599 (1986) (asserting that the
closely associated domain of fetal rights also implicates both the privacy and equality of
women).
3. See, e.g., Websler v. Reproductive Health Services, No. 88-605 in the Supreme Court of the
United States, Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, 11 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 249, 260 ( 1989) ("restric
tive abortion laws deprive women of their freedom to control the course of their lives and
restrict their ability to participate in society equally with men" ) ; cf. Frances Olsen, Unrav
eling Compromise, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 105, 110 (l989) ("Th e Court's privacy analysis ...
appeals to women's desire for equality and for sexual freedom").
4. In one respect privacy and equal protection concerns are quite distinct.The equal
protection case for abonion privacy presupposes gender differences and would therefore
.

evaporate if everyone were of the same gender and a potential childbearer. By contrast,

lI
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My p erspective endorsing the equal protection argument for
abortion rights is "additive."5 Since "any principled argument
that may help safeguard women' s freedom sh ould be advanced,"6
th e equal p rotection argument should be added to the list of
plausible constitutional arguments for abortion rights . Thus, the
comp lete list of constitutional abortion arguments arguably i n
cludes distinct Fourteenth ,7 Thirteenth,8 and First Amendment9
arguments. A competing perspective supporting the Equal
Protectio n Clause argument for abortio n migh t be dubbed "fixa
tive. " Thi s perspective maintains that the Fourteenth Amend
m ent p rivacy-related liberty argument is seriously flawed, 10 and
p erhaps even antagonistic to ideals of gender equality and full
citizenship for women.11 The fixative perspective contends that
an Equal Protection Clause argument could salvage the constitu
tional case for reproductive rights; privacy jurisprudence should
yield to a conceptually, jurisprudentially, and p olitically sup eri or
equal protection alternative.
Equal Protection Clause "fix" is tempting, in light of the
actual and perceived limitati ons of the abortio n privacy docAn

the privacy case for abortion does not necessarily evaporate in the absence of gender
differences. Limited government, along with opportunities for personal expression, self
development, intimacy, and repose would be important even in a hypothetical world in
which all citizens were of the same gender and could bear children.

5. Professor Nancy Rosenblum suggested the tenn "additive" to characterize my posi
tion on the relationship of privacy and equality arguments. She suggested another apt
characterization of my perspective: "co-dependency." Privacy and equal protection are
mutually dependent, in my view, inasmuch as privacy rights can promote equality and
equal protection can promote privacy and privacy-related liberties.

6. Linda McClain, The Poverty of"Privacy?", 3 COLUM.j. GENDER & L.

119, 121-22 (1992)

(defending abortion privacy jurispmdence while expressly reserving the "privacy versus
equality" challenge).

7. Many charge that the language of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment does not

support the abortion p1ivacy doctrine at all. I do not tackle their charge head-on here.
Were thev correct, however, any valid equal protection argument for abortion rights
would stand as the lone Fourteenth Amendment argument. But see Sheldon Geiman,

"Life" and "Liberty": Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Cu11ent Significa nce in

the Debate Over Abortion Rights,

78 MINN. L. REv. 585 ( 1994) (arguing that the word "life" in

the Fourteenth Amendment is a textual hook on which abortion law justifiably hangs its

constitutional hat). Although I endorse equal protection approaches in this essay, I do
not mount my own defense of them here.

8. See generally Andrew Koppleman, Farced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defeme ofAbor
U . L. REv. 480 (1984).
9. See Rachel Pine & Svlvia Law, Envisioning a Future foT Reproductive Liberty .')tmtegie.lfur
J'vfaking the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 418 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein. Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Speciall&ference to Pur
nography , Abortion and Su11ogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 , 29-44 (1992). See also Ruth Col!-;.er,
Abortion and Dialogue: Pro-Choice and Pro-Life in American Law, ti3 TuL. L. REv. � 363 ( 1992).
1 1 . See generally, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rejlections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991).
tion, 8,1 NVV.
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trine. 1 2 However, some of the most popular arguments e mplo ye d
to sustain claims of superiority for the Equal Protection Clause

argument for abortion rights do not withstand close analysis . I n
Part III of this essay, I analyze three claims made by Cass Sunstein
and others , starting with the claim that "conve n tional privacy"

has nothing to do with abortion rights . 1 3 I maintain that ordin ary

understandings of privacy bear greatly on the purposes and con

ceptualization of abortion rights . 14 Next, I assess and rej ect Sun
stei n ' s

further

claim

that

privacy j urisprudence

is

inferior

because it evidences disrespect for the unborn in a way e quality
j urisprudence does not. 1 5 I argue that privacy and e quality j uris
prudence are similarly neutral or non-neutral o n the question of
fetal

humanity or personhood.

Finally,

I

contend

that the

Supreme Court' s abortion funding decisions are n o t s traightfor
wardly attributable to the privacy doctrine . 1 6 There is reason to
think the same outcome for poor women could have been
reached, and is likely to have been reached, under an e qual pro
tection doctrine.
12. Cfjohn H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v . Wade, 82YALE LJ. 920
(1973) (arguing that privacy doctrine resurrects untenable substantive due process doc
trines); also cf. Olsen, supra note 3, at 117 ("Court should extend "privacy" doctrine to
women, even as we pursue efforts to dismantle the false dichotomies [of public and pri
vate] underlying it.").
13. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 31 ("an abortion decision does not involve conven
tional privacy at all").
14. "Privacy" has a broad and varied usage. Scholars who believe abortion relates to
privacy include both those who tend to characterize the meaning and value of privacy in
terms relating to the preconditions of human dignity, personal responsibility, personal
expression, self-development, intimacy, and repose; and those who emphasize under
standings tied to the political value of limited, non-totalita1ian government. Both empha
ses capture an important part of what male and female citizens merit. See generally, Anita
L. Allen, Uneasy Access, supra note 1, at 5-25. But see jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARv. L. REv. 737 ( 1989) (contrasting personhood-related and limited government
related conceptions of privacy and rejecting the former emphasis).
15. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 39-40 ("unlike privacy or liberty arguments, [equal
protection arguments] do not devalue the legitimate interest in protecting the fetus, and
indeed make it unnecessary to take any position on the moral and political status of un
born life"). See also Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion,
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L.REv. lOll, 1046 n.131 ("[P]ro-choice arguments often seem disre
spectful of the seriousness of the pro-life position.").
16. See Olsen, supra note 3, at 113 ("The abortion funding cases highlight ... limita
tions of the privacy analysis."); Deborah Rhode, Reproductive Freedom, in FEMINIST juRISPRU
DENCE 313, 305-321 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) ("The focus on privacy also has helped
rationalize the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions upholding withdrawal of public
funds for abortion services."); cf Laurence Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Ina
lienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330, 338
(1985) ("The Court's description of the woman's right as grounded in "privacy," rather
than in the relationship of women to men, might give a surface implausibility to a refusal
to provide p-ublic funding.").
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This essay will not mount a comple te defense of privacy-ori
ented and equal protection-ori ented abortion j urisprude n c e . A
defense of equal protection j urisprudence would necessitate
coming to terms with

Geduldig v. Aiello, 17

and the claim that the

Equal Protection Clause is not a proper vehicle for addressing
the overall inequality of women in socie ty. A defense of privacy
j urisprudence would include an understanding of why one need
not rej ect

Roe v . Wade8

and

Planned Parenthood v . Casey19

as illegit

imate substantive due process,20 as an abandonment of family
protection , 2 1 as "rootless activism,"22 or as lacking a constitu
tional foundation. 23 Except by insinuation , I will not much
broach that large task here . Nor do I attempt a complete defense
of privacy j urisprudence against all of the important feminist crit
icisms. 24 I have undertaken elsewhere to reply to Catharine
MacKinnon's well-known concerns that abortion law puts the
cart of privacy b efore the h orse of equality,25 urging that privacy
j urisprudence is not always conservative of a regime of affluent,
white male-domination.26 Linda McClain27 and D orothy Rob
erts28 seem to agree with my basic assessment of MacKinnon and
moreover, have thoughtfully assessed concerns of the sort voiced
by Joan Williams,29 Robin West,30 and Ruth Colker31 that privacy
j urisprudence is in conflict with women ' s responsibilities or ideal
e thics of care and compassion. 32
1 7. 4 1 7 U .S. 484 ( 1 973) .
1 8 . 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 972) (Biackmun , J. ) .
1 9. 1 1 2 S . Ct. 2791 ( 1 992) ( O'Connor, ]. ) .
20. See generally Ely, supra n ote 1 2.
2 1 . See David M. Smolin, The jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75
MARQ. L. REv. 975 ( 1 992) .
22. See Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BuRGER CouRT: THE
CouNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN T 1 98-2 1 7 ( 1 986) .
23. Cf Gelman, supra n ote 7 (writing that the original meaning of "liberty" in the Con
stitu tion is incompatible with the Court's abortion privacy jurisprudence) .
24. Sf� generally, Olsen , supra n ote 3, at 11 0-1ll ( privacy jurisprudence both attracts
and repels women and feminists ) ; see also .Allen, Taking Liberties, supra note 1 , at 470-473.
25. See generally MacKinn on , supra n ote ll, at 1 289.
26. See Allen, Uneasy Access, supra n ote 1, at 54-8 1 .
27. See generally McClain, supra n ote 6.
28. See generally D orothy E . Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 1 04 HARv. L. REv. 1 4 1 9 ( 1 991 ) .
29. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y. U . L.
REv. 1 559, 1 584 ( 1991 ) .
30. See Robin West, Farward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 H.'\Rv. L . REv. 43, 79-85
( 1 990) .
3 1 . See Colker, supra n ote 15, at 1 050-1 074.
32. Legal feminists are not alone in suggesting that privacy jurisprudence fails women.
See, e.g., Smolin, supra n ote 2 1 , at 1 020 ( "Privacy rhetorically claims to empower women
'
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The specific goal for this essay is to deflate the p reviously iden
tified trio of arguments commonly used by feminists and other
theorists of varied stripes to support the thesis that equal protec
tion is superior to privacy as a constitutional framework for abor
tion law. I believe abortion rights are a precondition of full
citizenship for women and disagree wi th those who believe pri
vacy-bas ed abortion j urisprudence is more of an impediment
than an aid. If it is true that privacy j urisprudence has delayed
women 's j ourney toward first-class citizenship,33 it is unclear that
an equal protection doctrine would serve as a surer ticket.
II.

SEcOND-cLASs CITI ZENSHI P

A.

The Constitution on Gender

Constitutional law treats gender. But how does i t treat gender
and how j ustly? Does it treat women as constitutional persons
and full citizens? The men who wrote the original Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, and the Thirteenth and Fourtee n th Amend
ments

did

not

intend

a

general

release

of women

from

subordinate and domestic roles . This history has led some to con
clude that the text of the Constitution provides no autho rity for
courts to invalidate legislation that discriminates on the basis of
gender, or that compromises wome n ' s lives, liberty, and property
more so than men ' s . Yet, one need not single out the j urispru
dence of gender equality as egregious j udicial activism . Scholars
and judges commonly locate j udicial authority in pri n cipled in
terpretations of the bare , abstract language of th e C o nstitution.

A general principle of formal equality-a principle that j ust
insti tutions treat like cases alike-is arguably the core meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34
Blacks and whites should be treated alike because they share a
common humanity; similarly, men and women should be treated
[but] it actually appears to increase the medical profession's domination over the preg
nant woman's person and body.").
33. Cf James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx.L. REv. 2 1 1 ,
277 ( 1993) (suggesting that Cass Sunstein's and Catharine MacKinnon's preference for
equal protection argument may be based on the idea that constitutional privacy is actually
a hindrance rather than a precondition of equal citizenship).
34. But see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 542 ( 1982)
(arguing that although appeals to equality are supplanting appeals to rights, equality is a
purely formal, superfluous concept "should be banished from moral and legal discourse
as an explanatory nonn"). See also Peter Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from its Hole: A
Response, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 1 86 ( 1 983) , responding to Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the

Idea of Equality?, 83

COLUM. L. REv.

1 1 67 ( 1983) .
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alike , because they, too, share a common humanity. Of course,
neither the races nor the sexes are alike in every regard. Respect
for the principle of formal e quality presumably squares with dis
parate treatment of men and women to th e extent of relevant
gender-specific biologi cal differences.
I t has proven impossible to demonstrate that gender-specific
differences are relevant to each and every social, political and
economic disadvantage imposed on women. The irrelevance of
gender differences to competence to practice la�5 and serve on
j uries36 seems clear enough today, but oth er supposed areas of
incompetence and unsuitability remain . Women need the pro
tec tion the Supreme Court has accorded them under the Equal
Prote ction Clause. They need h eightened judicial scrutiny of gov
ernment classification on the basis of gender,37 and preferential
affirmative action in education and employment.38
Needless to say, others would sharply disagree with these con
clusions. The Supreme Court's gender equality j urisprudence is
controversial . Some critics blast the Court for policy-making at
odds with ideals of the responsible nuclear family. Other critics
accuse the Court of falling short of equally protecting the inter
ests of poor women and women belonging to minori ty groups.
Indeed, the Court does not require government welfare pro
grams to subsidize elective abortions for poor women. Moreover,
current equal protection standards applicable to employment
classify discrimination as either race-based or gender-base d, im
plying femal e gender and minority race are mutually exclusive
traits in capable of compounding inj ury. 39
Contemporary feminist legal theorists generally concur that
constitutional doctrine imperfectly serves women and me rits revi
sion. We live in an age where it can seem doubtful that our soci
ety sti11 needs the messages of legal feminism. Recent television
advertisements, in which women stand on a corner comparing
the size of a man 's car to his penis and gather at their office
35. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding that Constitution does not invali
date state laws excluding women from law practice).

36. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
37. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
38. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
39. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginaliz.ing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Femi
nist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theary, and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139; ALL THE WoMEN ARE WHITE; ALL THE BLAcKS ARE MEN; BuT SoME or Us
ARE BRAvE (G. Hull, P. Scott & B. Smith, eds., 1982).
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windows to ogle a muscular construction worker, imply that
young women are n o different than their male counte rparts . The
careers of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Oprah Winfrey, and M a
donna imply that women can be as smart, e n te rprising and
raunchy as men. Although the lives of many i ndividuals and
many cultural phenomena reflect changing roles for wom e n ,
supporters o f thoroughgoing gender equality should not take
them as evidence of adequate movement toward gender equality.
What appears on the surface to be gender in equality m ay
sometimes reflect the voluntary preferences of men for tradi
tional men ' s roles and women for traditional wome n ' s roles . But
women doing the same work as men or similar work, rarely "p re
fer" lower wages and inadequate pregnancy benefits. Women
seeking lives outside the h ome rarely "prefer" discrimi natory bar
riers to their success. The inequality of the sexes visible in em
ployment,

business,

politics,

fine

arts,

science ,

and

high e r

education i s visible elsewhe re . Gender inequality i s particularly
visible in social practices relating to families and in legal debates
over regulating human reproduction.
For several decades abortion policy has been a focus of legal
debates over regulating human reproductio n . 40 The right to pri
vacy dominates discussions of constitutional abortion law, but
connections betwee n abortion rights and ideals of gender equal

ity have not gone unnoticed. Though shared to an extent by
men, the burdens of sexuality, pregnancy, and child-rearing are
overwhelmingly wom e n ' s burdens. Laws restricting access to
abortion make it more difficult for women to avoid these bur
dens. Women ' s legally enforced disadvantage s suggest "second
class" citizenship and unequal protection of law. Accordingly,
permissive abortion laws would seem to be required by the Equal
Protection Clause.
B.

The Meaning of American Citizenship

But what does it mean to be a full, first-class citizen? Accord
ing to Judith Shklar, American citizenship entails "the equality of
political rights" and " the dignity of work and of p e rsonal achieve
ment. "41 Linda Hirshman embraces a similar view, extolling "a
40. See generally, DAVID GARRow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRivACY AND THE
Ivi<\KING OF RoE v. WADE

41.

(1994).

See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ArvlERlGAN CITIZENSHIP: THE

QuEST FOR

INCLUSION

l (1991).

1
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and
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c onsigned

to

subo rdinate social and economic roles, by virtue of race , gender,
or another "immutable characteristic " 43 fall short of the ideal of
citizenship Shklar and Hirshman describe . Women with un
wanted children to care for, with low incomes, and with undigni
fying

work

prospects

are

unlikely

to

vote,

rule,

or

boast

extraordinary levels of personal achievement. Barriers for women
to meaningful participation in representative government and
the commercial economy place full American citizenship out of
reach.44
By comparison, men in the United States enj oy an enhanced
level of citizenship-first-class citizenship. In addition to the slate
of political rights they now formally share with women, men also
have social and economic power. Most relevantly, they have the
ability to enj oy sex, family life , school, and careers free of certain
basic, direct concerns about unwanted pregnancy and childcare .
To say that a man is a first-class citizen is to say that he is normally
" treated by the organized society as a respected and responsible
member, a participant, one who counts for something in the so
ciety. " 45 Of course, some men are not treated with the respect
they deserve . Their poverty, skin color, or immigrant status may
reverse the presumption that they are capable of responsible par
ticipation. But the healthy, heterosexual, non-disabled, affluent,
white, Christian men enj oy a particularly frictionless form of citi
zenship beyond the reach of o ther men and wome n .
Kenneth Karst partly attributes men's superior pol itical and
economic standing to differing social roles tied to their inability
to

bear

children. 46

Many

individual women

arguably

have

achieved first-class citizenship, despite childbearing capacities.
But the situation for women as a group is different. D espite sig
nificant legal gains, women as a group do not yet have the con
trol over their lives that men as a group do, especially affluent,
white men. For the ordinary woman to be an equal citizen , she
must, as Karst argues, gain control over her "sexuality and mater42. See Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues
of the Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1905, 1936 (1993 ) .
43. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 4 1 1 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (describing immutable
characteristics as "determined solely by the accident of birth" and as an inappropriate
basis for assessing "ability to perform or contribute to society").
44.

See Hirshman, supra note 42, at 1916-1921.
45. See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L. J. 44 7, 465 ( 1984).
46. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term- Foreward: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53-59 (1977) .
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[of the sort] the abortion rights movement has epito

mized

in

the

guarantees of

slogan,

'choice.' "47

Roe v. Wade48

Society

needs

the

legal

-or something similar emanating

from Congress,49 state legislatures50 or state courts.51 Only then
can

vvomen as a group participate as equal citizens alongside

men at all levels of personal and community life.
The claim that women need abortion rights as a condition of
first-class citizenship is usually understood as the claim that abor
tion rights are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for gender
equality. The responsibilities of unwanted pregnancy and child
care can relegate women to second-class citizen status, when
compared to men; but women who do not face unwanted preg
nancy, due to their sterility, infertility or menopause, are not,

facto,

ipso

first-class citizens, when compared to men. First, many wo

men who do not care for their own children assume responsibil
ity for the children of their daughters, sisters,

or others.52

Second, unwanted pregnancy and childcare are just two of the
factors that make women second-class citizens. All women have
certain social and economic disadvantages. All women are "kept
down" by cultural stereotypes and reproductive policies that dic
tate domestic, maternal roles, and track young working women
into low-paying jobs.
C.

Life Before Privacy and Equality: An Example

I claim a link can be established between first-class citizenship

and abortion rights. But skeptics view this claim as hyperbole.
Skeptics concede that homeless women or prostitutes in jail cells
may be second-class citizens; but they doubt that in one of the
richest nations on earth, women who are surrounded by loving
families are second-class anythings.
The Asnerican standard of living combined with the success

manv
women boast with respect
j
�

4,7. See 1\arst,
48. 410 u.s.

supra n o te 45,
113 (1973).

to

their maniag:es,
children,
CJ

at 463.

49. See Freedom of Cho ice Act of 1993, S. 25, 103rd Con g. , lst Sess. (1993) (proposed

legislation that would c odify the right to an abortio n establish ed

by Roe

v.

Wade).

50. SPe CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § l9a-602 (1994) (codifying the rig h t to an abortion

prior to fetal viability).
51. Se�: In

re

T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (h olding [hat there is a righ t to an

abonion under the Florida Constitu ti on, independent of the Roe v. �Vade decision).
52. T h is is sai d to be true of African Amen can wo men . See PATRICIA HrLL CoLLINS,

BLACK Fn.HNIST THOUGHT: KNo\NLEDGE, CoNSCIOUSNESS, AND THE PoLITICS OF EMPOWER
MENT 115 (1991) ("Grandmothers, sis ters, aunts , or cousins act

taking ch ild-care res ponsibilities for one a n other's children.").

as

o th er moth ers [sic] by
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housekeeping, community service, avocations, and employment
can obscure the reality of the ascription "second class." The "sec
ond class" label, which ought to apply to women of all races who
are incapable of avoiding basic social burdens, adheres more eas
ily to poor women belonging to historically subordinated racial
minority groups. Unlike affluent suburban housewives, these wo
men are distinctly disadvantaged. This may be why abortion
rights advocates fearing the death of Roe v. Wade in the Rehn
quist Court of the late 1980s, often stressed the needs of poor
minority women.53
The need for access to safe, voluntary reproductive services is
acute for poor minority women.54 It was acute in the life of my
own mother, who lived the first two decades of her life in a poor,
black, urban neighborhood. My mother's early history reads, for
her generation, like a case study in the need for race and gender
equality. She eventually moved to a racially integrated middle
class community and lived the life of a suburban housewife. The
history of the second half of her life reads like the composite
biography of a mid-century American everywoman coping with
the consequences of laws and cultural patterns that dictate moth
erhood and marriage while restricting access to contraception
and abortion.
Just a year after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 swept away formal
baniers to race and gender discrimination in employment, edu
cation, housing, public accommodations and voting, the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Griswold v. Connecti
cut. 55 The Griswold case established the "right to privacy," and
banned laws criminalizing married couples' use of contracep
tion. The same year Griswold was decided, my mother became
pregnant with her sixth child. She was not happy about the preg
nancy, and everyone knew it. She believed she had enough chil
dren and enough hard luck.
53. See generally L\u RENCE H. TRiBE, ABoRTION: THE CLo\SH OF ABsoLUTES (1990). See
Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 2.
54. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts VW!o Have Babies: Women of Colm;
Equality, and the Right of Priva0·· 104 R\Rv. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Racism and Patriarchy in the
Meaning of Motherhood, l J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RAcE & CLo\Ss
(1981); PATRiCIA]. WILLIAl'viS, THE ALcHEI'v!Y OF R".CE AND RIGHTS (1991); Loretta ] . Ross,

Afn:can-American Women and Abortion, in THEORiZING BLAcK FEMINISMS: THE VISIONARY
PRAGMATISM OF BLACK WOMEN 182 (1993); PATRiCIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST
THOUGHT:

KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERlv!ENT 115-138

(1991).
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

430

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 18

Few things had gone right in her life. She was born i n the
1930s in Atlanta, Georgia, where racial separation was strictly en
forced by the police and the specter of the Ku Klux Klan. She
grew up fearing, distrusting, and envying the whites who ruled
her world. She was, an orphan. Her mother gave her up to be
raised by her paternal grandmother, and then died several years
later of sickle cell anemia. Her first stepmother had a mental
breakdown and died young. Her unreliable father was an alco
holic and a womanizer. Within her grandmother's crowded
household lived aunts her own age who belittled her for being
very dark-skinned and not having a mother. She was raped in
adolescence. She became pregnant at fifteen. She married at
nineteen, had a second child at twenty, and then gave birth every
two to five years thereafter for nearly fifteen years. She devoted
her entire adult life to her husband and their children. She
never finished high school. She never had a job outside the
home-her proud husband, my father, would not consider ex
posing her to the glare of other men in the workplace, even
when bad debts led him to file for bankruptcy. My father, an en
listed man in the Army, was periodically sent to Asia for twelve to
eighteen-month tours of duty. Yet, for the longest time my
mother did not know how to operate an automobile; did not own
anything of her own; and did not have power of attorney to do
family business in the name of her spouse.
Despite these hardships, she maintained a household seem
ingly without want and conflict. Perhaps that is why, at the age of
twelve, I could not comprehend why my mother did not want to
have another child. When I overheard her saying to a friend that
she would have an abortion, were it possible, I was angry. I wrote
furiously in my journal: "How could she not want to have a baby;
what else does she think she's for?" My mother did not have the
illegal abortion she contemplated. She had a baby, hoping, she
told us later, that maybe this child would be the one who would
bring her a glass of water when she was old.
While my father was away in Vietnam, my mother mustered the
courage to start taking oral contraceptives, against his will. In re
sponse, he had a vasectomy when he returned from the war. She
said he felt the surgery restored his control and thus his passion.
After all of her children graduated from high school, and her
husband left the army, went to college, and became manager of a
consumer loan company, my mother earned a high school
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equivalency degree, and attended a local business college. It took
her a long time to complete her training. Her schooling was in
terrupted by serious illness, the births and needs of grandchil
dren, the marriages and divorces of daughters, and the slow
deaths of her grandmother and father.
When her schooling was done, my mother was hard to employ.
She was a frumpy fifty-five year old quarrelsome black lady who
chain-smoked, openly resented authority, and did not speak in
proper English. A few months after she landed her first full-time
job as a sales clerk in a retail discount store, she was diagnosed
with lung cancer and died, ironically, on the birthday of her sixth
child.
Although the story of my mother's life may imply hard luck is
the exclusive domain of second class citizens, it strikes first class
citizens as well. My mother seemed to believe, correctly, I think,
that her race and class origins in poverty inadequately accounted
for the frustrations of her life. Her gender fixed her fate. Being a
woman meant being a wife and mother to the exclusion of other
ambitions.
vVhen I was a girl, my mother preached that if I became preg
nant or dropped out of school, the best part of my life would be
over. I stayed in school for many years, and postponed mother
hood until middle-age. My life has been much easier than my
mother's. In many respects, I am the multi-dimensional citizen
she longed to be. I am economically prosperous and have a
happy family. Yet I have an ambivalent relationship with my sta
tus as a citizen, at least when citizenship is given its loftiest polit
ical meanings. Like many successful women, I feel that my
citizenship is worth less than it would be if women as a whole
were free of lingering inequality at home, at work, in govern
ment, in science, and in the arts.
D.

The Trivialization of Citizenship

Despite exposure to poignant accounts of women's lives, com
mitted skeptics will continue to doubt that women without liberal
abortion rights are less than first class citizens. Conservatives on
the abortion issue say that a person's political freedom and
equality does not depend on access to a medical procedure
designed to end pregnancy. The implication is that it would trivi
alize the democratic constitutional vision to include abortion
rights as essential citizenship guarantees; that the linkage

f
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claimed between first-class citizenship and abortion rights is
wrong and fraudulent-j ust so much glib polemics and inflated
rhetori c . The conservatives b elieve that abstinence and birth con
trol, and if those fail , adoption and moderate sacrific e , can as
sure that women ' s lives are as good as any man ' s .
The debate in the Supreme Court over whether access to abor
tion should be deemed a fundamental right can be recas t as a
debate about wh ether women ' s citizenship status is diminished
by unwanted pregnancy. Justice White 's dissent in

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 56

Thornburgh

v.

condemned Jus

tice Blackmun 's characterization of abortion rights as "funda
mental . "57 Applying historical and political criteria called for by
the Constitution, White argue d that abortion rights are neither
deeply rooted in the nation ' s history and tradition , 58 nor are they
implicit in the concept of " ordered liberty. "59 While one can dis
pute both White 's historiography and his p olitical theory,60 I am
interested in his political theory.
Analyzing the concept of consti tutional liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause is an exercise in itself.6 1 But if constitu
tional liberty does not include reproductive control , then a na
tional

citizenship

of

persons

free

to

engage

in

political

participation and work continues to mean something disturb
ingly different for male and female citizens. Women would be
assured an inferior status since abstinence, birth c ontrol, adop
tion, and sacrifice are not realistic options for all women.
The United States is only one of many nations whose political
leaders, lawyers, and j urists fail to see the link b e tween abortion
rights and citizenship . It appears that the leaders of most West
em democracies view the matter as American abortion conserva
tives

do:

liberal

abortion rights are not essential

to

equal

citizenship and liberty for women . Few countries in the world
56. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) ( Blackmun , J . , authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Brennan , Marshall, Powell, and Stevens JJ., j oined. Stevens, J., also filed a concurring
opinion. Burger, C . J., filed a dissenting opinion; Wh ite , J . , filed a dissenting opinion
j oined by Rehnquist, J . ; and O 'Connor , .J . , filed a dissenting opinion in which Rehnquist,
J . , joined) .
57. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772 ( Blackmun, ] . ) ; !We, 410 U.S. at 152, 155 (Blackmun,
].) .
58. Justice White derived this test from Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)
59. Justice White derived this test from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 3 1 9, 325, 326
( 1937 ) .
60. See generally, DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, ToLERATION AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1986) .
61. See generally Gelman, supra note 7.
0
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have enacted abortion laws that give women the freedom and
e con omic subsidy they would need to control their reproductive
capacities.62 In Japan, abortion is readily available and more
highly regarded by the medical establishment than oral contra
ceptives. But even there , abortion rights are not widely viewed as
prerequisites of citizenship.
E.

GERMAN CITIZENSHI P

AND

ABORTION RIGHTS

The patterns of abortion law around the world suggests four
"models'' of express regulation:

(l)

prohibition, ( 2 ) permission,

(3) prescription, and ( 4) privacy. 63 Prohibition is the model in
nations like Ireland that punish most abortions as criminal of
fenses.64 The model of permission is in effect in countries like
France where laws permit abortions that meet more or less s trin
gent criteria established by government.65 The model of pre
scription allows government officials to penalize unauthorized
pregnancy and childbirth , as in the People ' s Republic of China.66
Finally, where the model of privacy obtains, government may not
enact legislation that criminalizes, prohibitively restricts, or re
quires medically safe abortions, as in the Unite d States, immedi
ately after the Supreme Court decriminalized abortion in 1 973,
the model of privacy exists.
Germany, which is still undergoing a complex process of na
tion rebuilding, aptly illustrates that Western liberal leaders do
not view reproductive options as a core requirement of citizen
ship or "ordered" liberty. Rising from the dust of felled Berlin
Wall was a hope of a better life for male and female citizens of
E ast and West Germany.67 German reunification required a rec
onciliation of the liberal abortion policies of the East, with the
more restrictive policies of the West.68 In function but not rheto62 . See INITRNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON ABORTION (Paul Sachdev ed. , 1988 ) . But see john
Tackaberry, Canada: New Abartion Law But opponents Vow to Continue the Battle, Inter Press
Service, May 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, INPRES File.
63. See Anita L. Allen, Legal Aspects of Abartion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BroETHICS (MacMil
lan 2d ed., 1994 forthcoming) (elaborating four models of abortion regulation) .
64. See INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 458-62.
65. Cf MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DrvoRCE IN WESTERN LAw: AMERJCAN FAIL
URES, EuROPEAN CHAlLENGES 15-18 (1987) (describing abortion policies of European
countries).
66. See INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 100-103.
67. Cf Serge Schmemann, Germans Codify DetaiLs of Union, N .Y. TIMES, Sept. l , 1990, at
A3 (describing the legal and social process of reunification).
68. See Key Dates in History of German Abartion Law, REUTERS, May 28, 1993 (available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUWLD File ) ; Stephen Kinzer, German Court Restricts Abartion,
Angering Feminists and the East, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at Al .
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ric , the model of privacy governed the Eas t and the m odel of

1

permission governed the West. Reunification made ab orti on law
as controversial in Germany as it has been in the United States.
A compromise Eas t-West German abortion statute was e nacted
into law on June 2 7, 1 992.69 The compromise law movin g the
enlarged nation of Germany towards the model of p rivacy was
not liberal enough for many former East Germans. The law re
moved criminal penalties for me dical abortions prior to the
twelfth week, if preceded by physician counselling; thereby plac
ing the decision for early abortion in the hands of the individual
women. However, the requirement of counselling compelled wo
men to j ustify and explain themselves to the authori tative desig
nees of the state . Moreover, the captioning preamble to the law
did not suggest any policy concern for women . It referred only to
" the protection of prenatal/nascent life " , the "promotion of a so
ciety suitable for children " , and , vaguely, to " conflicts involving
pregnancy,

and

the

regulation

of

the

termination

of

pregnancy. "70
The German statute of 1 992 was grounded in a model of per
mission. The statute was similar to the Pennsylvania law partly
upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1 992

Casey71

Planned Parenthood v.

decision . Women must endure waiting periods and other

elaborate "informed consent" rituals that the state hopes wil l dis
courage abortion. 72 By virtue of

ices73

and

Casey

the

United

Webster v. Reproductive Health Sero
States

has

taken

a

giant step

backwards away from the model of privacy towards paternalistic
intervention and the model of permission.
O n May 28, 1 993, Germany's highest court rule d the 1 992
compromise statute unconstitutional. T h e Court invalidated th e
law on the ground that it was in conflict with a consti tuti onal
provision it construed to require the state to protect all human
life. The Court invited the Parliament to enact new l egislation
consistent with its findings that, although abortion in certain
grave , exceptional instances can be permitted, the s tate must spe69. Ferdninand Protzman, Broader Abortion Law Leaves Germans Somber, N.Y. TIMEs, June
27, 1992, at A3.
70. § 218 StGB (1992) [based on language of an unofficial translation of the compro
mise statute].

71. 1 12 S. Ct. 279 1 ( 1992).
72. See David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 SuP. Cr. REv. l ,
4.

73. 492 u.s. 490 ( 1 989) .
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cifically discourage abortion through counselling and insurance
policies.
A c hi ef difference between the U . S . and German consti tu
tional law of abortion is that Germany has a specific constitu
tional

provision

thought by its

Supreme

Court

to

address

expressly the right to life of the unborn. Perhaps wary of seeming
to flout post-Nazi commitments to preserving human life, the
German Court found it impossible to endorse the modestly per
missive scheme set forth in the 1992 law. Yet, the German High
Court pronounced that abortion may be obtained under its rul
ing, if the life or health of the mother is at stake , the pregnancy
results from rape, or the child would be born severely h an di
capped. The exceptions the Court recognized and its failure to
mandate enforcement of criminal sanctions against those who il
legally abort means that there will be abortions in Germany, and
many will not meet the Court's official ideal. Germany seems
trapped in the same quagmire of rules, exceptions, illogicy and
hypocrisy that mars abortion policy in the Uni ted States.
The U . S. and German experiences reveal that democratic na
tions are not yet prepared to accept the proposition that citize n
ship implies legally guaranteed reproductive options fo r wome n .
Western democratic liberalism i s n o t prepared t o accept abortion
c hoice as a right no less than th e right to travel , to practice one ' s
fai th , or to b e free of arbitrary arrest. For now, for our leaders,
first-class citizenship does not mean reproductive control .
III.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION FOR EQUAL CITIZENSHIP

An Equal Protection Jurisprudence for Abortion Law

Many scholars now believe that gender equality and equal citi
zenship require reproductive freedom, and that the Equal Pro
tection Clause should be marshalled against state and federal
abortion restrictions . 7 4 Although "laws restricting access to abor
tion plainly oppress women," explains Sylvia Law, originally the
right to abortion was "not presented to the courts as a clear issue
of sex equality. "75 Instead, advocates challenged abortion restric74. See, e.g. , Gumo CAL<\BRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAw ( 1 985) ; Colker,
supra note 1 0 ; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 ( 1 985) ; Karst, supra note 45; Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 1 32 U. PA. L. REv. 955 ( 1 984) ; Catharine A. MacKinnon , supra note 1 1 ;
Seigal, supra note 2 , at 379; Sunstein, supra note 1 0.
75. See Law, supra note 74, at 973, 1 020.
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Griswold: s

p rivacy doctrine, they challenged them on the basis of Four
teenth Amendment liberty. Second, they challenged them on the
basis of Fourteenth Amendment equal protec tion, recognizing
that the illegali ty of abortion h ad a especially h arsh adverse im
pact on blacks , especially poor black women. 76 The racial impact
argument never to ok hold in the Supreme Court, and the privacy
argument stood alone. Liberals on the Court converted the advo
cates' call for equality for black and poor wome n i n to a side-bar
pragmatic policy consideration, where it has remained. Ironi
cally, the Burger C ourt has been criticized fo r inve n ting privacy
j urisprudence in a moment of " roo tl ess activism" precisely to
make it possible to secure for poor women the reproductive free
dom rich women enj oyed . 77 "No effort," Vincent Blasi con
cluded, "was made in the

Roe

opinion to relate the woman ' s

burdens to more general conceptions o f choice-making capacity,
bodily integrity, nonsubordination to other human b ei ngs, or
equality of treatment. " 78

Roe was

mo tivated "by largely pragmatic

considerations"79 relating to the fact that "many wealthy women
were flouting the law to get abortions from respected p hysicians
[while] many poor women were being inj ured by inadequately
trained mass purveyors of illegal abortions. "80
In

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
much of Roe's traditional privacy j urisprudence. H owever, Justice
O ' Connor's opinion for the Court expressly linked abortion
rights to equality as well as privacy. Without their " unique" repro
ductive liberty, women are unable " to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation," she wrote . 8 1 Even before

Casey,

one could detect increasing awareness that th e abortion

debate has a " gender dimension."82 In Justice Blackmun 's pas
sionate dissent in

·webster v. Reproductive Health Services, he said h e
feared for th e liberty and the equality of women.83 Blackmun ' s
maj ori ty opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists referred to the "promise that a certain private
sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely b eyond the reach
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

!d. at 973.

See Blasi, supra note 22, at 2 1 1 .
!d. at 2 1 2.
!d. at 2 1 3.
!d.
Casey, supra note 7 1 , at 2809.

See O lsen , supra note 3, at 1 1 8.

492 u.s. 490, 556 ( 1 989) .
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of government"84 and asserted that this "promise extends to wo
men as well as to men . "85
A year after the Casey decision Justic e Ruth Bader Ginsburg
j oined the Court. Ginsburg has advanced a strong equality-based
perspective on abortion rights . 86 Her view is that gender inequal
ity is perpetuated by abortion restrictions and that the Equal Pro
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a strong b asis for
claiming abortion rights under the Constitution. It is so s trong
that Roe was weakened by "concentration on a medically ap
proved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a consti tutionally
based sex-equality idea. "87
Noting that "abortion restrictions selectively turn wom e n ' s re
productive capacities into something for the use and control of
others" and that " [ n ] o parallel disability is imposed on men,"
Cass Sunstein has offered a particularly clear outline of the ele
ments of a strong equal protection argument for abortion rights
of the general sort Ginsburg and others advocate:
In its fullest form, the argument from equality is supporte d by
four diffe rent points : ( l ) prohibiting abortion is a form of
p rima facie or de jure sex discrimination ; ( 2 ) it is imperrnissi
bly selective [in compelling parentage ] ; (3) it results fro m
constitu tionally unacceptable stereotypes [ of differen t roles
for men and women ] ; and ( 4) it fails sufficiently to p ro tect
fetal lives [since history shows that nearly as many abortions
occurred in the U.S. when abortion was illegal] . 88
I will not undertake to defend Sunstein ' s well-defended version

of the equal protection argument. (Doing so would take me
afield of my main obj ective, which is to evaluate claims of supeii
ori ty for equal protection over privacy arguments . ) The literature
contains adequate defenses of similar equal protection argu
ments, including Sylvia Law's classic defense . 89 Professors Law
and Sunstein have in common the desire to articulate what they
call a "neutral" standard for review of abortion restrictions90 a
goal progressives may think hopeless . I will note that point ( 4) of
Sunstein ' s outline may be the most difficult to sustain , as esti
mates of the number of illegal abortions prior to Roe v. �Vade
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90 .

Thornburgh, 476 U . S. 747, 772 ( 1 986) .
Jd.
See Ginsburg, supra n ote 74.
ld. at 386.
Sunstein , supra note 10, at 3 1 -32.
See Law, supra n o te 74; see also Pine and Law, supra note 9.
See generally Law supra n o te 74; see generally Sunstein supra note 1 0 .
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range from a low of 200,000 to a high of 2 million. 9 1 It may b e
most fair t o conclude that on e cannot be certain that a lower
percentage of pregnancies would be terminated if abortion were
re-criminalized.
B.

Equal Protection as a Replacement for Privacy

The growing affinity among j ustices of the Supreme Court for
an equality jurisprudence of reproductive rights is c onsistent with
a "mounting consensus"92 in the scholarly community that equal
ity arguments are , not only available , but "better than liberty ar
guments with respect to abortion generally."93 A number of
feminist legal theorists who advocate strong abortion rights , favor
constitutional alternatives to the doctrine of privacy-related lib
erty. They view p rivacy law as distorting the truths of women ' s
lives a n d impeding wome n ' s equal citizenship. C atharine Mac
Kinnon has broadly assaulted privacy j urisprudence in ab ortion
law,94 arguing that " the doctrine of privacy-related liberty has b e
come the triumph of the state ' s abdication of women in the
name of freedom and self-determination. " 95 Privacy doctrine
works only if women are e quals within the private sphere . Mac
Kinn on argues that privacy law and other "legal attempts to ad
vance women"96 are based on false assumptions about the status
quo , "as if women were citizens-as if the doctrine was n ot
gendered t o women 's disadvantage, as if the legal system had n o
sex,

as i f women were

gender-neutral

persons

temporarily

trapped by law in female bodies . "97 Joan Williams' ambivalence
about arguments premised on " choic e , " "liberty" and "privacy"
stems from her observation that women seeking abortion do n ot
feel especially free.98 The language of privacy implies that wo
men are choosers against a background of a number of realistic,
attractive alternatives. Pregnant women wh o consider abortion
9 1 . See H. RosEN, ABoRTION IN AMERICA ( 1 967) (placing the number of criminal abor
tions as between 200,000 and 2 million). It is unclear whose estimates should be believed.
Rosen ' s hold special interest as a p re Roe estimate.
92. Sunstein, supra note 1 0, at 3 1 n . 1 1 9; see also Calabresi, supra note 74, at 1 10-1 1 1 .
-

93.
94.
95 .
96.
97.
98.
1 559,

Jd.

See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93- 1 02 ( 1987) .

MacKinnon, supra note 1 1 , at 1 3 1 1 .
ld. at 1 286.

ld.

Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N .Y.U. L. REv.
1 584 ( 1 99 1 ) ( "The choice rhetoric is not the simple unadulterated truth of wo
men 's lives: many aborting women feel they have no choice but to abort."). Williams
refers to "choice" as a libertarian rhetoric and an autonomy-self development rhetoric.
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are not often so situated. The concepts of privacy, liberty and
choice are at odds with the sense of choicelessness women seek
ing abortion actually feel. In general , " c h oice rhe toric is not ap
propriate where patterns of individual behavior follow largely
unacknowledged gender norms that operate to disempower wo
men. " 99

Ruth Calker's rej e ction of the privacy doctrin e is partly

ontological. She insists that the privacy-related liberty doctrine
relies on the false assumption of the existence of an autonomous
sphere-women and fetuses-beyond public life . Calker sees a
connection between reproductive rights and compassionate so
cial participation that she believes e quality perspectives capture
better than privacy perspectives: " e quality doctrine does n ' t de
mand that women be allowed to choose to have abortions be
cause women are entitled to be treated with autonomy," but
"insists that women be allowed to c hoose to have abortions b e
cause of wome n ' s position in society-the roles and responsibili
ties of women in society. " 1 00
IV.

AssESSING THE EQUAL PROTECTION Fix

For theorists who believe the privacy doctrine should be aban
doned, equal protection doctrine promises to "fix," not j ust sup
plement the constitutional case against abortion restrictions.
They believe it is a superior constitutional framework. Are e qual
ity arguments be tter than privacy or liberty arguments with re
spect to abortion generally? I think the case has yet to be made
that they are .
A.

Abortion as a "Privacy " Concern ?

Cass Sunstein bases his thesis of the superiority of e quality ar
guments on a number of claims, including this one: Abortion
rights relate to equality and liberty, but have little to do with
99. !d. at 1 633.
1 00 . RuTH CoLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRo-CHOICE AND AMERJC.A.N LAw 85
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1 992) .
Ruth Colker explains that: " [M ] y defense of women's ability to choose to have a baby is
not absolute . . . it is not embedded in the argument that a woman has the right to control
h er body under any circumstances . . A woman in my view has the right to seek an abor
tion to protect the value of her life in a society that disproportionately imposes the bur
dens of pregnancy and child care on women and does not sufficiently sponsor the
development and use of safe, effective contraceptives." Feminism, Theology and Abortion:
Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 0 1 1 , 1 050 ( 1989) .
.
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" conventional privacy. " 1 0 1 On this point, Sunstein is wrong. " Con
ventional" privacy has much to do with abortion and with repro
ductive rights generally.
By "conventional privacy" Sunstein means privacy in the famil
iar senses of physical seclusion, solitude, anonymity, secrecy, and
confidentiality. The First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments
are routinely interpreted as protecting these conventional pri
vacy interests . Theorists sometimes contrast privacy in Sunstein ' s
conventional o r paradigmatic sense o f limited access t o persons
and information with the controversial idea of " d e cisional pri
vacy. " D ecisional privacy can be understood as the liberty, free
dom

or

autonomy to

make

choices about one ' s

own

life,

minimally constrained by unwanted government or other outside
interference. Those who rej ect the "decisional" sense of privacy
as a semantic confusion of the word "privacy" with the words "lib
erty," "freedom , " or "autonomy" easily fall into

the trap of

wrongly concluding that abortion rights have n othing to do with
privacy. Whether O"!" not constitutional abortion rights are coher
ently framed as promoting a decisional brand of p rivacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment, abortion rights plainly promote
conventional forms of privacy for women.
Sunstein and oth e rs have missed the evident connection b e
tween conventional privacy and reproductive rights b e cause they
ove rlook the respects in which the traditional roles of home
maker, wife , and mother are inconsistent with ideals of personal
privacy. For many women , homelife is anything but a haven for
the experience and enj oyment of personal privacy. Although
meaningful opportunities for personal privacy consist of quality
time and space for one 's self, caretakers often cannot seclude
themselves. Successful parenting demands that women be highly
accessible and highly responsive to the wants and needs of their
children. Parenting may be a greater hour-to-hour psychological
responsibility for mothers than for fathers . It remains to be seen
what impact the consequences of motherhood will p rove to have
on

women's permanent entry into the public realm as equal par

ticipants and contributors.

1 01. Sunstein, supra note 1 0, at 3 1 . Although Sunstein recognizes the l i beny i n terest in
abortion, h e believes the substantive due process critique of the privacy-related liberty
jurisprudence, see generally Ely supra note 1 2 , makes it less appeaiing than an equal protec
tion jurisprudence.
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All of this suggests that, for the sake of conventional privacy in
the senses of seclusion and solitude , women ought to take special
care when deciding whether or not to have childre n . D ecisional
privacy rights protecting access to birth control and abortion do
not automatically entail conventional privacy and self-de termina
tion for all women . Two factors determine whether decisional
privacy translates into genuine opportunities fo r salutary modes
of personal privacy. First, women ' s decisional freedom must not
be preempted by insurmountabl e social and economic b arriers
to the exercise of legally protected choice . Second, fre e women
with a choice must be willing to choose privacy.
Procreative privacy rights are tools women can use , and are
already using, to create opportunities for meaningful privacy in
private life . This is why feminists are mistaken to dismiss " privacy"
rights as mere conservative male ideology. For some feminists ,
"privacy" and "private sphere" connote probl ematic conditions of
female seclusion and subordination in the home and in domestic
caretaking roles. American women have had ample experience
with privacy and the private sphere in this unhappy sense. Wo
men have had too much of the wrong kinds of privacy: they have
had home-centered, caretaker ' s lives, when

they have ofte n

needed and wanted forms of privacy inside and outside the home
that foster personal development, while also making the m more
fit for participation in social life . 1 02
Traditional caretaking rol es have kept women ' s lives centered
in the privacy of the nuclear family h ome . Conventions of female
chastity and modesty have shielded women in a mantle of privacy
at a high cost to sexual choice and self-expression. Expectations
of emotional intimacy have fostered beneficial personal ti es. At
the same time, women 's prescribed roles have limited their op
portunities for individual forms of privacy and independently
chosen personal association. Maternal and social roles have kep t
women in the private sphere w h o might otherwise have distin
guished themselves in the public sphere as businesswomen,
scholars, artists and government l eaders.
Women who seek out and utilize opportunities for privacy, en
abling them to rejuvenate or to cultivate talents, are women vvith
something qualitatively better to offer others. A degree of privacy
in our lives can help to make us more fit for social participation.
1 02. See generally ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss, supra note 1 .

I
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I t can help u s to contribute to the full level o f o u r capacities. I t

can make u s better, more equal citizens. Procreative rights pro
mote privacy by helping women preserve and create opportuni
ties for privacy in the context of responsible lives.
Of course, t o concede that abortion rights promote conven
tional privacy is not to concede that the Court ever had good
reason to embrace or stipulate a decisional understanding of
"privacy" and to associate it with the Constituti on . 1 0 3 Many the o
rists ( perhaps Sunstein included) insist that the whole idea of
" decisional" privacy is a mistake . 1 04 They raise several argu
ments . 1 05 First, they argue that, as an aspect of liberty, freedom,
or autonomy, decisional privacy stands apart from paradigmatic
forms of privacy such as seclusion, solitude , and anonymity. Sec
ond, theorists contend that we lose our ability to treat privacy
and liberty as distinct concepts if we speak of " d e cisional" privacy.
D efenders of the decisional usage of "privacy" c ounter that deci
sional privacy is worthy of the name . 1 06 They emphasize that
although decisional privacy denotes aspects of liberty, freedom,
and autonomy, it denotes aspects of these that pertain to deeply
felt

conceptions

of a private

life

beyond

le gi timate

social

involvement.
Controversial or not, using "privacy" to d enote a domain
outside of legitimate social concern is now an e n trenched prac
tice in the United States. I t may be significant that women in the
United States now believe that their privacy, as well as their lib
erty and equality, is compromised by harsh abortion restricti ons .
If they did not always feel that way, feminists and liberals have
taught two entire generations of women to describe the intuitive
wrong they feel when denied reproductive options as invasions of
their privacy. Whatever "privacy" may have once meant, it now
also means free dom from abortion restrictions. This linguistic
development undercuts some of the power of critics wedded ex
clusively to the " conventional" or paradigmatic understanding of
privacy. Large segments of the male and female public now view
103. Cf Whalen v. Roe, 429 U .S. 589 ( 1 977) (acknowledging physical, infonnational
and decisional conceptions of privacy as pervasive in constitutional law) .
1 04. See, e.g. , Ruth Gavison , Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 42 1 ( 1 980) .
105. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy in Health Care, Encyclopedia of Bioethics ( Macmillan, 2d
ed., forthcoming 1 994) ( discussing decisional privacy and its antecedents in classical
antiquity) .
106. See, e.g. , Judith W. D eCew, Defending the Private in Constitutional Privacy, 2 1 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 1 7 1 ( 1987) .
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excluding others from "personal" decisionmaking as a form of
pnvacy.
Western law and political theory are rooted in the Grec o-Ro
man tradition, a heritage which may provide a degree of historic
and etymological validity to the curren t practice of referring to
freedom from interference with personal life as "privacy. " The
decisional usage of "privacy" h as origins in classical antiquity' s
distinction between private and public spheres.
The Greeks distinguished the "public" sphere of the

polis,

or

city-state, from the "private" sphere of the
The Romans similarly distinguished
community, from

res privatae,

oikos, or household.
res publicae, concerns of the

concerns of individuals and fami

lies. The ancients celebrated the public sphere as the sphe re of
political freedom for citizens. The public realm was the sector in
which select men-th ose whose property and economic virtue
had earned them citizenship and the right to participate in col
lective governance-could truly flourish . By contrast, the private
realm was the sector of mundane e<;:onomic and biologi c neces
sity. Wives , children and slaves populated the private economic
sphere, living as subordinates and ancillaries to autonomous
male caretakers .
The Post-Enligh tenment Western liberal tradition inherite d
the premise that social life ought to be organized into public and
private spheres. 1 0 7 It also inherited the premise that the p rivate
sphere is properly constituted by the home, the family, and inti
mate association. However, while ancient thought tolerated the
private and celebrated the public, modem liberal though t often
reflects an opposing tendency: it tolerates the public as pervasive
and necessary for collective welfare, but celebrates the private as
an

essential

expression

of personal

identity,

freedom,

and

responsibility.
The political concept of a limited, tolerant government is elab
orated by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson as a requirement of
natural rights, and by John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith as a re
quirement of utility. Both of these obj ec tives require a n on-gov
ernmental, private sphere of autonomous individuals, families
and voluntary associations. Though liberals sometimes speak of
public and private as if they were fixed natural categories, femi
nist privacy theorists often emphasize that the public and the
1 0 7 . See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CoNDITION 38- 7 8 ( 1 958) ; jURGEN HABE RJviAS ,
THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 3-4 ( 1 962) .
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private are not metaphysical realities, b u t continge n t understand
i ngs of how, as a matter of policy, we believe p ower ought to be
allocated among individuals, various social units , a n d govern
ment. Lib erals often explai n privacy rights as negative l ib e rties to
freedom from government involvement; but feminists often give
p rivacy an affi rmative twist, arguing that p rivacy righ ts can man
date governm e n t involveme n t where, without it, material needs
render privacy righ ts ineffec tive .
The time has come for consti tutional lawyers to aban don their
stock and trade cri ti cism that abo rtion j urisprudence is premised
on semantic c onfusion about privacy. I t is true that e arly repro
duc tive rights cases reflected a degree of confusio n . However, the
Supreme Court h as remedied the simplistic and confused under
standings of " conve n tional" and " decisional " p rivacy reflected i n
the e arliest reproductive rights cases.
Th e precise relationship presumed to exist b etween decisional
privacy and conventi onal privacy was not clear i n
Roe. In

Griswold Justice

Griswold

and

D ouglas seemed to conflate physic al p ri

vacy and decisional privacy when he raised th e issue of enforce
ment of criminal con traception laws . 1 08 Justice Blackmun in

Roe

seemed to co nflate " conve n tional " restricted access privacy ri ghts
with decisional privacy rights when he made his m e taphysi cally
suspec t j udgment that a " pregnant woman cannot b e isolated
[ from the fe tus] i n her pregnancy" as a ground fo r limiting h e r
decisional prerogatives. 1 09
Ye t, in the

Thornburgh

case, Blackmun cleared up the confu

sion well enough : stipulati ng that th e " privacy" of the Fourte e n th
Amendment aborti on cases is th e claim to be fre e fro m forms of
gove rnment in terference with decisions affecting sex, reproduc
ti on, marriage , and family life . 1 1 0 At the same tim e , Blac kmun
exp ressly recognized that, in the context of abortio n , conven
tional forms of p rivacy, namely anonymi t-y and confiden tiali ty i n
health-care re cordkeeping a n d reporting, are key ancillaries for
safeguarding decision al privacy. 1 1 1 After

Thornburgh,

abortion l aw

cases re·vi.ewing the consti tutionality of spousal and parental n o ti
fication and

consent

requirements have raised anonymity, se

crecy, confidentiality, and o ther information access

concerns

108. Griswold v. C o n n ecticu t , 381 U.S. 479, 486 ( 1965) ( D ouglas, J.) .
109. See generally Allen , Taking Liberties, supra n o te l .
1 1 0. Thornburgh, 476 U . S. 747, 765-767 ( 1 986 ) .
111. Id. ( "The decision to terminate abonion is an intensely p rivate o n e th at must be
p rotected in a way that assures anonymity . " )
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without appearing to confuse or conflate c onventional with d eci
sional privacy concerns.

1 12

Indeed, the body of constitutional

abortion law as a whole reflects a solid understanding of the se
manti cs of "privacy. " It acknowledges decisional and non-deci
sional uses of privacy and appreciates that confidentiality and
anonymity are needed to protect independent abortion decision
and action.
These several considerations-the practical link betwee n re
productive rights and paradigmatic forms of p rivacy such as med
i cal confidentiality and solitude at home ; the Supreme Court's
eventually careful distinction among decisional, physical , and in
formational forms of privacy; the etymology of

res privatae;

and

patterns of popular "privacy" usage-strongly mandate rej ec ting
Sunstein ' s claim that abortion rights have little to do with con
ventional privacy. If an equality j urisprudence for abortion is su
perior to a privacy j urisprudence , it is not because the practice
and regulations of abortion lack conceptual ties to privacy.
Today, constitutional abortion law reflects clarity about the
definition of the word "privacy. " More than twenty years and
twenty cases after

Roe v. Wade,

constitutional lawyers are unfair in

their designation of abortion j urisprudence as conceptually con
fused about privacy. Bases for debate over the reach of Four
teenth Amendment liberty remain for abortion law. This might
imply the superiority of equal protection-based abortion j urispru
dence were it not the case that equality j urisprudence also in
spires

serious

debates

about

the

reach

of the

Fourteenth

Amendment.
B.

Greater Respect for the ''Pro-life " Perspective

Cass Sunstein claims a second advantage for equality and equal
protection arguments over privacy or liberty arguments:

Moreover these [equality] . . . arguments have a large advan
tage in that unlike privacy or liberty arguments, they do n o t
devalue the legi timate interest in protecting the fetus, a n d in
deed make it unnecessary to take any position on the moral
and political status of u nborn life. Even if the fetus has all of
the status of human life, the bodies of women cannot be con
scripted in o rder to pro tect it. 1 1 3
1 1 2. See, e.g. , Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1 1 2 S.Ct. 279 1 ( 1 992) ; Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 1 73 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 4 1 7 ( 1 990) .
1 1 3. Sunstein, supra note 1 0 , at 39-40.
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In claiming this advantage, too , Sunstein is mistaken . As I will
argue, in principle, privacy arguments do not devalue the legiti
mate interests in protecting the fetus any more than e quality ar
guments; nor do they, in principle, make it any more or less
necessary to take a position on the moral and political status of
unborn life .
Blackmun ' s opinion in

Roe v . Wade employed

a privacy ration

al e . As a consequence, the most familiar pro-choice arguments
happen to be privacy arguments, and privacy arguments are asso
ciated with vehement pro-choice and pro-life conflict in the
United States. Privacy is blamed for the vehemence of the con
flicts even though there is little reason to think pro-life activism
would have been less committed or hostile had wom e n ' s e quality
rather than th eir privacy been held out as the justification for
permissive abortion laws . The pro-choice position s eems shrill
and unreasonable to those who do not share it b e cause it places a
range of concerns, including wome n ' s privacy, e qual protection,
personal satisfaction, bodily integrity, and e conomic well-being
above the protection of the beginnings of innocent human life .
Sunstei n ' s claim that privacy needlessly devalues the unborn
was doubtless prompted by

Roe

v.

Wade' s

stan c e , maddening to

some, that the s tate lacks an inte rest in the unborn at the start of
pregnancy. The Court in

Roe concluded

that " [ a] t some point in

pregnancy" th e state interest in "protecting potential life " be
comes "sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation "; and wen t
o n t o identify "viability" as the point at which the State ' s interest
in p o tential life becomes " compelling. " 1 1 4 But
feature of

&e

v.

Wade,

Casey m odified

this

holding that the state h as an interest in

t h e unborn sufficient to warrant protective regulation on behalf
of the unborn at all s tages of pregnancy, so long as the regulation
does not " unduly burden" the woman 's right to p rivacy. 1 1 5 By af
firming the basic privacy right of access to early abortion, while
asserting a governmental interest in the unborn at every s tage of
pregnancy,

Casey

enacts the analytic possibility of asserting gov

ernmental interest in the unborn while confe rring s trong privacy
righ ts for women seeking early abortion.

Casey may

be an uneasy

compromise , but it establishes that valuing the unborn and advo
cating a significant degree of decisional privacy for women are
not utterly incompatible .
1 1 4. 4 1 0 u.s 1 33, 1 54, 1 63-164 ( 1 973) .
1 1 5 . Casey, 1 1 2 S.Ct. 279 1 , 2820 ( 1992) .
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In associating the devaluation of the public interest in unborn
life with privacy arguments, Sunstein may have been reacting,
not only to

&e,

but to abortion privacy advocates who agree with

th e philosophy that fetuses are not human beings or persons
meri ting state protection . A number of philosophers supportive
of abortion privacy jurisprudence have aggressively argued that
fe tuses are neither moral persons 1 1 6 nor c onstitutional per
sons, 1 1 7 but merely potential persons lacking serious rights to life
or

interests

government may protect at pregnant women ' s

expense.
The privacy argument associated with

&e

v.

Wade

and de

fended by philosophers who deny fetal personhood does not " de
value" the concept of fetal protection by government in the
strong sense needed to give Sunstein ' s claim weight. That is, it
does not ridicule the very idea of fetal humanity or community
interest in the fate of the unborn . A belittling

ad hominem

attack

against the Pope or an imprudent analogy of fetuses to cancers
or parasites amounts to ridicule . By contrast, the seri ous privacy
argument typically advanced simply disagrees that the govern
ment has legitimate grounds for categorically prohibiting the in
terruption of pregnancy.
Moreover, far from denying fetal personhood or humanity,
some versions of the privacy-related liberty argument advanced
by pro-choice theorists expressly concede it. Some versions of the
privacy argument admit or avoid taking a position on the moral
and legal status of th e unborn . The privacy argument is n o more
wedded to the claim that the government lacks an interest in the
unborn than is the equality argument. Some exponents of the
privacy argument may happen to believe fetuses lack m oral an d
l egal interests the state is bound to protect. Some exponents of
the privacy argument may happen to believe that fe tuses are par116. MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE, IN THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF
ABoRTION 52, 77 ( Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon eds., 1974).

Tooley argues against personhood for the unborn on the ground that personhood re
quires characteristics the unborn and perhaps even infants do not possess, such as the
capacity for self-conscious reflection. " [A] n organism possesses a serious right to life only
if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subj ect of experiences and other
menta l states and believes that it is such a continuing entity." Id.
117. See, e.g. , Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, NEw YoRK REviEW OF BooKS,
June 29, 1 989, at 49-53. Dworkin argued that "if the fetus is a constitutional person then
Roe v. Wade is plainly wrong." !d. at 50. He then argues that the fetus is not a constitutional
person, only "an entity of considerable moral an d emotional significance in our culture"
that can be protected " in ways that fall short of any substantial abridgement of a woman 's
constitutional right over the use of her own body." Id. at 52.
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asites o r the Pope a j oke. But the same is true o f some exponents
of the equal protection argument.
To grasp this idea, it is useful to compare Sunstein ' s an ti-con
scription version of the e quality argument, grounded in ideals of
equal protection, to Judith Thomson ' s anti-conscrip tion argu
ment, grounded in i deals of (privacy-related) liberty. 1 1 8 Sunstein
rec ognizes Thomson ' s argument as an example of on e that "sees
a prohibition on abortion as invalid because it involves a c o-opta
tion of wome n ' s bodies for the protection of fetuse s , " but that
does not base opposition to abortion prohibition on robust
equality grounds . 1 1 9 He fails to recognize that the p ossibility of a
liberty-oriented anti-conscription argument that concedes the
worth of the unborn, could undermine his claims that equal pro
tection arguments are superior by virtue of their concessions of
fetal worth.
Both Sunstein and Thomson are prepared to grant the moral
worth of the unborn as a premise of their argume n ts. As Sunstein
says describing his own argument, their argumen ts "freely ac
knowledge [ ] and, indeed, insist [ ] on the strength of the inte r
est in protecting fetal life . " 1 20 The thrust of Sunstein ' s argument
is that by restricting access to abortion, government is c on
scripting women to share their bodily resources, while not impos
ing similar Good Samaritan duties on other citizens:
Government never imposes an obligation of this sort o n its cit
izens-even when human life is uncontroversially at stake . Par
ents are not compelled to devote their bodies to the
protection of c hildren, even if, for example, a risk-free kidne{'
2
transplant is necessary to prevent the death of their child. 1

To sharpen his ultimate constitutional point that government
cannot conscript women into the service of o th ers, Sunstein
draws an analogy to what he regards as a patently unacceptable
1 1 8 . Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABOR
3-4 ( Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel , and Thomas Scanlon , eds., 1 974) . It is not
relevant to this discussion that Thomson is among those reductionist privacy the orists
who advocate using the language of liberty and property rather than privacy to describe
freedom from government interference. See also Judith Jarvis Thomson , The Right to Pri
vacy, 4 PHIL. & Pus. AFF . , 3 1 5-333 ( 1 975) . My point is that, however denonimated, Thom
son believes that what the Court calls its "privacy" jurisprudence is defensible with or
without the premise that the fetus is a person or human.
1 1 9. Sunstein remarks that "I am indebted to" Thomson but h er treatment of abortion
prohibitions does not "sufficiently emphasize issues of sexual equality." Sunstein , supra
note 1 0 , at 3 1 and n . 1 20.
1 20. /d.
1 2 1 . /d. at 34.
TION,
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hypothetical case of race-based conscription. He conte nds that
constitutionally, Mrican-Americans may not be turned into un
willing lifesaving blood donors, even for other blacks or minority
group members. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits singling
out a person on the basis of race or gender for service to others .
Thomson stresses the general abhorrence to compulsory Good
Samaritanism in American law, 1 22 agreeing with Sunstein that
" abortion restrictions selectively turn women ' s reproductive ca
pacities into something for the use and control of others . " 1 23
Thompson ' s libertarian defense o f abortion choice features a hy
potheti cal: a person abducted in the night, whose body is at
tached to a famous violinist as life support, has no obligation to
remain, but is morally at liberty to detach herself and leave the
violinist to die of renal failure . 1 24 One may not be conscripted to
save the violinist, whatever the violinist' s human worth .
Thomson's argument points to unwilling conscripts ' and preg
nant wome n ' s right to choose-their decisional privacy, one
might say-to use their bodies and lives as they please. H owever,
the structure of her liberty argument is identical to the structure
of Sunstein ' s equality argument. Thomso n ' s liberty-base d anti
conscription argument, like Sunstei n ' s equality-based argument,
expressly seeks to avoid a stand which denigrates the moral and
politi cal status of the fetus. Thomson ' s contention is that, h ow
ever precious the fetus or talented the violinist, a woman cannot
be made to sacrifice herself. Fetuses have no right to life requir
ing that they be carried to term in a society in which wome n ' s
lives are uniquely impaired by unwanted pregnancies. Both lib
erty and equality versions of the an ti-conscription argument
place the forces of law ideally on the side of the would-be con
script-the pregnant woman-and not the fetus.
It is implausible to suppose that privacy rhetoric inflames th e
pro-choice and pro-life debates in a way that equality rhetoric
would not have, had it been the choice of the Court in

Wade.

Roe

v.

As Joan Williams points out, " claims for women ' s e quality,

particularly in contexts involving sexuality, trigger fears of chaos,
filth, and defilement. " 1 25 Surely it is the common bottom-line of
permissive abortion policy that provokes the virulence of pro1 22. See Thomson, supra note 1 1 6, at 20-2 1 .
123. Sunstein, supra note 1 0 , at 3 1 .
1 24. Seejudith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Deaths, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABOR·
TION 1 1 4 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974) .
1 25. Williams, supra note 29, at 1 586.
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choice and pro-life politics. Those who blame p rivacy j urispru
dence for the intractability of abortion politics imply that pro-life
Americans would quietly accept the deaths of the unborn if they
were premised on wome n ' s right to equal treatme n t rather than
on women ' s right to make their own decisions about their
bodies.
O n D ecember 30, 1 994, two women were kille d at Planned
Parenthood and Preterm Health SerVices clinics in B rookline,
Massachusetts. Accused killer John C . Salvi, who also wounded
several other people at those clinics that day, was apparen tly a
strong opponent of abortion.
On July 29, 1 994, Dr. John Britton, a Florida abortion doctor,
and two elderly pro-choice volunteer escorts were gunned down
by Paul Hill, director of the violence-advocating an ti-abortion
group Defensive Action . 1 26 Hill, a former Presbyterian minister,
killed the doctor and one of the escorts with a twelve-gauge shot
gun aimed at their heads . 1 2 7 In the same town seventeen months
earlier, Dr. David Gunn, another abortion provider, was mur
dered by a man associated with the pro-life movement. 1 28 Wnile
denounced by some pro-life advocates, Paul Hill does h ave "some
significant support" 1 29 for his position that:

" [ t] he Christian principle is to do unto others as you would

have them do u n to you. If an abortionist is about to violently
take an innocent perso n ' s life, you are entirely morally j usti
fied in trying to prevent him from takin g that life . " 1 30

Applying this logic, those who kill at abortion site s d o not care
whether wome n ' s equality or privacy is the reason legal abortions
take plac e. From their perspective, the substance rules.
126. Ronald Smothers, Death of a Doctor: The Overoiew-Abortion Doctor and Bodyguard
Slain in Florida; Protester is Arrested in Pensacola 's Second Clinic Killing, N .Y. TIM ES July 30,
,

1 994, at A l .
127. !d.
128. See Griffin to Appeal His Conviction of Murdering Doctor, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 1 994,
at 5B. The defense claimed that graphic videos and anti-abortion literature "disturbed
Griffin's state of mind to the extent he confessed to a crime he did not commit," !d. The
brother of the victim agreed that "maybe the [anti-abortion] propaganda . . . the movies
. . . [ and] the meetings . . . may have pushed [ Griffin] " to kill his brother." Griffin Verdict
Praised, MIAMI HERALD , Mar. 7, 1 994, at 5B. However, the Prosecution called the items
"irrelevant and inflammatory," and the judge ruled that the jury would not see the evi
dence, id., at 5B.
129. See generally Tamar Lewin, Death of a Doctor: The Moral Debate - Abortion Doctor and
Bodyguard Slain in Florida; A Cause Worth Killing For? Debate Splits Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1 994, at Al . Some of the nearly 1 00 anti-abortion leaders, who recently confer
enced in Chicago, have not voiced their condemnation of Hill's violence, instead they are
"reserving most of their outrage for those who interfere with abortion protests." !d.
130. Smothers, supra note 126, at Al .
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In sum , neither the privacy nor the equality arguments for re
productive control , in principle, condemn unborn life as worth
les s and claims of state interest as spurious. Both conclude that
government may not assume the absolute power to decide the
fate of the unborn, given what is at stake for women . Disagree
ments about bottom lines, about the extent to which abortion is
permitted or restricted, is what divides Americans . 1 3 1
C.

Pinning the Blame for the Funding Decisions

Privacy j urisprudence is blamed for the Court's refusal to grant
poor women the right to state and federal assistance for elective
or "non-therapeutic" abortions . 1 32 The usual argument is that
conceptually privatizing abortion as in

Roe rules

out public assist

ance. 1 33 Critics say the right to privacy means limited government
involvement; it would be reasoning against the grain of p rivacy
j urisprudence to find in the idea of a governmental duty to leave
people alone, the idea of a governmental duty to assist the poor
in seeking abortions.
This criticism of the

Roe

decision is problematic for a number

of reasons . First, it implies that liberal values in principle rule out
all public programs. Although extreme libertarians have taken
this view, more moderate and nuanced liberal political th e ories
that value limited government do not proscribe all forms of pub
lic assistance . The "liberal" Western nations have sought in prac
tice to balance independence from government interference
with reliance on government aid needed to make meaningful in1 3 1 . My own basic bottom-line response is the same as it was in my book, UNEASY AC
CESS: PRNACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE SociETY ( 1988) . See also Anita L. Allen , A utonomy 's
Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B. U. L. REv. 683 ( 1 992) , Tribe 's
judicious Feminism, 44 STAN. L. RF.v. 1 79 ( 1 99 1 ) , and Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice,
and Social Contract Theary, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 46 1 ( 1 987) .
1 32. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 ( 1 980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 ( 1 977)
(holding that neither state nor federal government must pay for a poor woman 's abor
tion ) . See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 1 73 ( 1 99 1 ) ( holding, under Title X of the Public
Health Act, that the Government has no affirmative duty to commit any resources to
facilitating abortions) ; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 ( 1 989)
( holding a state may restrict the use of public funds and facilities for the performance or
assistance of non-therapeutic abortions) ; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 ( 1 977) ( h olding that
Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require a state to fund n on-therapeutic
abortions as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program established by that
Act) .
1 33. See generally Ruth Colker, supra note 15; MacKinnon, supra note 1 1 ; Olsen, supra
note 3; Sunstein , supra note 1 0 . But see Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv.
330, 338 ( 1 985) ( concluding "it becomes difficult indeed to justify the government's deci
sion not to fund an impecunious woman 's choice of abortion" ) .
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dependence possible. A number of feminists, including Rachel
Pine and Sylvia Law, have suggested that American constitution
alism could accommodate affirmative understandings of privacy
related liberty that are broad enough to support abortion fun d
ing. For example , responding critically to the abortion fun ding
cases, Pine and Law countered with a "feminist concept of repro
ductive freedom" based on "affirmative liberty" and the idea that
"government has the obligation to insure that pe ople can make
reproductive decisions freely. " 1 34 D oro thy Roberts, in reaction to

Rust v. Sullivan, 1 35

describes a "liberation theory" version of con

s titutional liberty that would "recognize the importance of infor
mation for self-determination and therefore " place an affirmative
obligation on the government to provide [ aborti o n ] information
to people who are dependent on government fun ds . " 1 36
Blaming privacy j urisprudence for the funding d ecisions is
problematic for a second reason: it implies that these decisions
would have stood a chance of coming out differe n tly had

Roe

been decided on e qual prote ction grounds . It is highly implausi
ble to suppose that the funding cases would have come out dif
ferently

if

Roe

had

been

expressly

defended

under

equal

protection principles. The logic of equal protection in American
constitutional law has not always required that the p oor be given
the resources needed to make them the substantive e quals of
o ther citizens. Equality is open in our jurisprudence to " equal
opportunity" rather than " equality of results" in terpretations.
The Court could h ave acknowledged the goal of abolishing dis
criminatory abortion laws, while ruling that the Constitution ' s
Equal Protection Clause does not require government abortion
subsidies.

Roe v. Wade

was a Burger Court decision. I t is especially un

likely that that particular Supreme Court would h ave made th e
short leap from abortion equality to abortion subsidies. The Bur
ger Court was notable for an expansive Due Process Clause j uris
prudence, but a narrow reading of Equal Pro te c tion . 1 37 The
Burger Court constricted the fundamental rights s trand of equal
protection that had enj oyed expansion during the Warren Court
134. Pine and Law, supra note 9, at 42 1 and n.53 and 54.
135. 500 u.s. 1 73 ( 1 99 1 ) .
136. D orothy E . Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 6 1 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 587, 640 ( 1 993 ) .
137. See Michael Klannan, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 9 0 MICH . L .
REv. 2 1 3 , 289-90 ( 1 991 ) .
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era. In deciding equal protection cases, the Justices of the Burger
Court "were more comfortable forbidding state regulation of ce r
tain spheres than requiring government equalization . . . of fun
dam ental interests such as education , fo od, shelter, and m e di c al
care . " 1 38 For the Burger Court the " reconceptualization of e qual

protection as an entitlement to affirmative government assist
ance" was "unpalatable . " 1 39 And because it was, the Court c ould
have reasoned that prohibiting states from criminalizing abor
tion was a requirement of gender equality, but compelling state
and fe deral government to pay for poor women ' s abortions was
not.
It is often assumed that concerns for wome n ' s equality argue,
wi thout question, for abortion subsidies. Yet many in the United
States are mindful of the histo ry of slavery and medi cal abuses of
women and people of color. 1 40 As a consequence, state and fed
eral legislators supportive of gender equality can cite egalitarian
reasons for caution about sponsoring non-therapeutic aborti ons
for poor women on welfare , many of whom are Latinos, recent
immigrants ,
lead

to

Al though

and African-Americans. Such sponsorship could

the
I

appearance or reality of compulsory abortion .
favor

public

abortion

subsidies ,

I

do

so

circumspectfully.
The future of meaningful health care reform in the Unite d
States i s uncertain. However, the intense debates in 1 99 3 and

1 994 over abortion benefits under President Bill Clinton ' s p ro
posed Health Security Act remain instructive on th e question of
whether privacy jurisprudence is to blame for the adverse out
come in the abortion funding cases. In the context of proposed
Congressional legislation, as in the context of j udicial adj udica
tion, accepting the right to abortion has not require d accep ting
the concept of public funding. I t is unlikely that a

Roe

v.

Wade

premised on equal protection would have made a difference in
the outcome of the debates about publically subsidized heal th
insurance. Some members of Congress and th eir constituents op
pose the idea of forcing taxpayers to subsidize acts they find h ei
nous on moral and religious grounds. The real foe of subsidized
1 38 . !d. at 289.
139. !d. at 289-90.
140. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 54, at 1 444; Diana Axelsen, Women as Victims of Medical
Experimentation: ]. Marian Sim5 ' Surgery on Slave Women, 1 845- 1 850, 2 SAGE 10 ( 1 985) . Cf
jAMEs joNES, BAD BLooD: THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS E xPERlMENT ( 1 98 1 ) ( chronicle of gov
ernment-sponsored experiments on black men with syphilis) .
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medical abortion is not the supposed conceptual implications of
p rivacy j urisprudence. Rather it is the widespread m o ral and reli
gious substantive opposition to killing the unborn , 1 4 1 c ombined
with pervasive p olitical opposition to government compelled
complicity with felt moral and religious wrongs.
The rhetoric of privacy may fuel the abortion d ebate s , but the
substance is driving them: a segment of our society is opposed to
abortion. Some people are pro-life and do not want to pay for
abortions through their taxes . Inde e d , some people who are pro
choice and pro-gender equality do not think i t is clearly proper
to ask those who are pro-life to subsidize abortions. Were the cur
rent Supreme Court miraculously to adopt the e qual protection
framework for abortion law tomorrow, and the next day hear a
constitutional challenge to a comprehensive national health in
surance law that excluded mandatory abortion coverage, it is an
open question how the Court would decide the contest. It seems
probable that the Court would find the law consti tutional.
V.

CoNCLUSION

Privacy j urisprudence is criticized as too flimsy to s erve as a
stable base fo r abortion rights . 1 42 Some critics of &e e mbrace an
equal

protection alternative not yet expressly tested in the

Supreme Court. O pponents of &e on the Court have not said
they would change their votes if the grounds of abortion were
presented in equal protection terms. Nor have the pro-life activ
ists parading in front of clinics and vying for the attention of the
media promised to throw down their placards in retreat if the
Court adopts an equal protection analysis of abortion law. The
reason , I believe , is that some judges and activists oppose the
practice of abortion, not only "right to privacy" j urisp rudence.
In identifying factors that galvanized the an ti-ab ortion move
ment, Justice Ginsburg did not cite privacy j urisp rudence itself;
1 4 1 . See Robin Toner, Political Memo; Abortion and the Health Plan: Hard Questions in Both
Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1 2 , 1 993, at A20. The Clinton health plan "creates a complicated
new issue for" both pro-life and pro-choice activists "because [ th e plan's) unified system
with subsidies for the poor will largely erase the line between Federal and private money
in the insurance sys tem." ld. Anna Quindlen, Publir. and Private; Trading Card, N .Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1 993, at A27. Clinton's plan offers a new set of conscientious obj e ctions for an
issue which "will be argued on the basis of deeply held feelings about what is just and
moral, not on fiscal prudence." Jd.
1 42. See David M . Smolin, The jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75
MARQ. L. REv. 975, 985 n.5 l (citing numerous works critical of Roe v. Wade's adoption of
privacy jurisprudence) .
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rather she cites the "sweep and detail" of the opinion in Roe

Vvade. 1 43

v.

The Court all at once swept away most of the nati o n ' s

criminal abortion statutes and handed the states a trimester
based guideline for regulation aimed at protecting women' s
health and the state' s interest i n potential life . Among those who
oppose " [h ] eavy-handed" 1 44 judicial intervention in whatever
guise , for whatever cause, p rivacy jurisprudence is blame d for the
unpopularity of permissive abortion laws . Yet an equal protec
tion-based abortion jurisprudence of similar sweep and detail
striking down all criminal abortion statutes that categorically out
lawed early abortion and dividing pregnancy into trimesters of
permissible and impermissible forms of regulation-might have
inspired similar reactions. One must consider the possibility that
equal protection can look "better" today only because it has not
yet been tousled in the fray.

1 43. See Ginsburg, supra n o te 74,
1 44. /d. a t 385.

at

38 1 .

